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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct.
2898 (1979).
On July 2, 1979, the United States Supreme Court decided Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale,I a recent development concerning the public's right
of access to a criminal proceeding. Delivering the plurality opinion,
Justice Stewart framed the issue as "whether members of the public
have an independent constitutional right to insist upon access to a pre-
trial judicial proceeding, even though the accused, the prosecutor and
the trial judge all have agreed to the closure of that proceeding in order
to assure a fair trial."2 The Court held that the public does not possess
this right. 3
In August, 1976, a Seneca County, New York, grand jury indicted
two men, Greathouse and Jones, on charges of second degree murder.4
Judge DePasquale heard the defendants' motion to exclude the public
and press from a pretrial suppression hearing. Defense attorneys urged
that because the intense buildup of damaging publicity had threatened
their clients' ability to receive a fair trial, the press and the public
should be excluded from subsequent proceedings. No objections were
made and Judge DePasquale granted the motion. Gannett Company's
subsequent motion to vacate the order was refused. The trial judge
held that the interest of the press and the public was outweighed by the
defendants' right to a fair trial.'
1. 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979) (5-4 decision).
2. Id at 2901.
3. Id at 2907.
4. Id at 2902. Wayne Clapp disappeared at a lake in July, 1976, about 40 miles from
Rochester, New York. His two companions returned in the boat the same day and drove away in
Clapp's pickup truck. Clapp's family reported his absence to police who began an investigation.
An intensive search revealed an abandoned boat, laced with bullet holes. Id at 2901.
Gannett Company, Inc., publishes a morning and an evening newspaper. Each paper carried
the story of Clapp's disappearance and both noted that the police were looking for Clapp's com-
panions, Greathouse and Jones. Later stories reported the capture of Greathouse and Jones.
"[Plolice theorized that Clapp was shot with his own pistol, robbed, and his body thrown into
Lake Seneca." Id at 2902. The morning newspaper noted that Greathouse was on probation in
Texas. Id One day later, an article in the morning paper stated that "Greathouse had led...
police to the spot where he had buried a .357 magnum revolver belonging to Clapp ...... Id
Finally, the papers carried stories of the indictments and arraignments. Id at 2902, 2903.
5. Id at 2903.
1
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Gannett commenced a prohibition and mandamus proceeding in
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
The court held that under the circumstances, the publics vital interest
in open judicial proceedings was paramount and vacated the trial
court's order.6 The New York Court of Appeals subsequently held that
the case was technically moot,7 but retained jurisdiction because of the
importance of the issues.' Reaching the merits, the court upheld the
exclusion of the press. It reasoned that although criminal trials are pre-
sumptively open to both the public and the press, the danger posed to
the defendants' ability to receive a fair trial, in this situation, overcame
this presumption.' In response to this ruling, Gannett successfully peti-
tioned for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. 10
I. PLURALITY OPINION
Although the Supreme Court was sharply divided" on both the
result and its underlying rationale, all the Justices agreed that the con-
troversy was not moot.' 2 The plurality articulated the bounds of the
sixth amendment 3 with an analysis aided by two Supreme Court deci-
6. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 App. Div. 2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976).
7. A transcript of the hearing had been made available to Gannett. 99 S. Ct. at 2904 n.4.
8. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977).
9. The court stated that the following situation endangered the defendant's right to receive a
fair trial:
The public knew that [the] codefendants had been caught "red-handed" by [the]
police with the fruits of the crime. And it was widely known that the defendants had
made incriminating statements before being returned to ... [New York]. The details,
however, were not known and public curiosity was intense. To safeguard the integrity of
its process, the court was required at the outset to distinguish mere curiosity from legiti-
mate public interest.
Id at 380-81, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
10. 435 U.S. 1006 (1978). The Court granted certiorari "[b]ecause of the significance of the
constitutional questions involved .... " 99 S. Ct. 2904 (1978).
11. Justice Stewart delivered a plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell and Rehnquist filed concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring
only with the plurality's holding on mootness. His dissent on all other parts was joined by Justices
Brennan, White and Marshall.
12. The plurality articulated a test for mootness. An issue is not moot "if the underlying
dispute between the parties is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" 99 S. Ct. at 2904. To
meet the test, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the challenged action must have been too
short in its duration for full litigation. Second, there must have been a "reasonable expectation
that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." Id The Court
unanimously found both conditions satisfied. Id at 2904, 2919.
13. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 15 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss1/9
TULSA LAW/ OURNAL
sions.14 This analysis was subdivided into an examination of an ac-
cused's right to a public trial and the public's correlative right to an
open trial. Examining the first of these issues, the Court discussed two
cases.
In In re Oliver,'5 the Court was faced with a due process challenge
to a secret proceeding.16 The defendant appeared before a secret one-
man grand jury investigation of official misconduct. As a result of the
judge's belief that the defendant's testimony was false, the defendant
was sentenced to sixty days in jail for contempt. Although the defend-
ant was sentenced without the presence of counsel, the Supreme Court
of Michigan rejected his claim that he had been deprived of a right to
due process. 7 After granting a writ of certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court held that regardless of the due process issue, the depri-
vation of the defendant's right to a public trial required a reversal.18
The Court recognized that the constitutional guarantee of a public trial
is for the defendant's benefit and that the proceedings in question vio-
lated that right. 19 The Court pointed to the practice of guaranteeing a
public trial as having its roots in English common law.20 "[T]he guar-
antee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to
employ our courts as instruments of persecution." 2 1
The Gannett opinion also discussed Estes v. Texas22 to demon-
strate that the right to a fair and public trial belongs to the accused. In
Estes, the defendant was indicted on a swindling charge by a Texas
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
14. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
15. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
16. Id at 265. Michigan law provided for a one man grand jury to conduct investigations
into alleged misconduct of public officials. If the judge presiding at the investigation believed the
witness to be giving false, evasive or deliberately misleading testimony, he was empowered to find
the witness guilty of contempt.
17. Exparte Oliver, 318 Mich. 7, 27 N.W.2d 323 (1947).
18. 333 U.S. at 266-73.
19. Id
20. Id at 266-69. The Court pointed to institutions which have symbolized threats to liberty.
"The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been variously ascribed to the noto-
rious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star
Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse of the letire de cachet." 333 U.S. at 268-69 (foot-
notes omitted).
21. 333 U.S. at 270. The plurality in Gannett found the purposes of the public trial to be:
"Openness in court proceedings may improve the quality of testimony, induce unknown witnesses
to come forward with relevant testimony, cause . . . participants to perform their duties more
conscientiously, and... give the public an opportunity to observe the judicial system." 99 S. Ct.
at 2907.
22. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
[Vol. 15:164
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grand jury.2 3 Tremendous pretrial publicity had flooded the commu-
nity and television cameras were permitted to film the courtroom pro-
ceedings. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's right to a fair
trial was violated by the broadcasting. Initially, this holding may seem
paradoxical because increased publicity would seem to make the trial
more fair.24 The Estes Court rationalized its result with four justifica-
tions.
First, the most significant danger is the effect that the in-courtroom
media might have on the jury.25 As soon as the trial judge announces
that the trial will be televised, it becomes a sensational event. The
Court believed that such sensationalism cannot help but permeate the
juror's mind. As the effect of this permeation cannot be evaluated, it is
a potentially prejudicial variable in the trial and, therefore, such broad-
casting is impermissible. 26 Second, the Court maintained that the pres-
ence of cameras may be distracting to a juror.27 The knowledge that he
is being televised may make the juror self-conscious and preoccupied.
A third element of unfairness to the defendant is the possibility that a
witness could view parts of the proceedings before being called upon to
testify.2" By this action, a witness could frustrate the purpose of invok-
ing the rule against witnesses being in the courtroom prior to rendering
their testimony. Fourth, the Court discussed the effect of in-courtroom
publicity on both the defendant and the judge. The Court indicated
that the job of the trial judge is made more difficult because the pres-
ence of cameras creates an additional area requiring supervision.29 The
judge is, therefore, unable to devote full attention to the actual court
proceedings. As a result, the defendant is prejudiced by the problems
which inhere in the televising of proceedings.30 The Court stated that
the impact of courtroom television "is a form of mental-if not physi-
cal-harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree. 31
The Estes justifications relate to potentially prejudicial activity at
the trial. The concept of public trial cannot, however, be separated
from the accused's right to a fair trial. It may be forcefully argued that
23. Id at 534.
24. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
25. 381 U.S. at 545.
26. Id
27. Id at 546.
28. Id at 547.
29. Id at 548.
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the presence of cameras actually encourages conscientious participation
in the proceedings and thereby ensures the defendant's right to a fair
trial. Estes, however, rejected the proposition that publicity is an abso-
lute assurance of a fair trial. The impact of Estes on Gannett relates to
the interplay between the accused's right to a fair trial and his right to a
public trial. This impact is that "[a] public trial is a necessary compo-
nent of an accused's right to a fair trial and the concept of public trial
cannot be raised to defend conditions which prevent the trial process
from providing a fair and reliable determination of guilt."'3 2
After having reviewed the Estes and Oliver decisions, the Gannett
plurality examined the policy behind granting the right to a fair trial to
the accused. The plurality conceded that society has a strong interest in
public trials.3" The opinion recognized that the quality of testimony
may be improved, that those involved with the trial will be more con-
scientious, and that the public will have an opportunity to observe the
judicial decision.34 The plurality differentiated, however, between the
public's interest in an open proceeding and a constitutional right vested
in the public. 35 "[O]ur adversary system of criminal justice is premised
upon the proposition that the public interest is fully protected by the
participants in the litigation. ' 36 The plurality construed the public in-
terest to be conditioned upon the system's ability to provide the defend-
ant with a fair trial. The opinion noted that as long as the adversarial
nature of the proceedings is sufficient to ensure a fair trial to the de-
fendant, the public's interest is protected.37 The plurality thus focused
on the adversarial nature of the judicial system as the guardian of the
public's right to observe the litigation.38
The plurality bolstered its opinion by demonstrating that the his-
tory of the sixth amendment does not reveal an incorporation of the
common law rule of open criminal proceedings.39 In contrast with
32. Id at 583 (emphasis added).
33. 99 S. Ct. at 2907.
34. Id
35. This point is expanded in Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMPLE L.Q. 381 (1932).
The author's thesis is that the right to a public trial is designed to protect the defendant against the
potentially prejudicial effect of closed door proceedings. If this right were construed to be vested
in the public, rather than the defendant, the prejudice could still result if& for example, the hostility
of the crowd were such that it could sway the jury. It is accordingly for the defendant to decide
that degree of publicity which will assure him a fair trial. Id at 394, 396-98.
36. 99 S. Ct. at 2908 (footnote omitted).
37. Id at 2907-08.
38. Id at 2908.
39. Id at 2910-11.
[Vol. 15:164
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early state constitutions that provided for a public right to open trials,
the sixth amendment confers the right to a public trial only upon a
criminal defendant.4" Further historical support is derived from the
fact that the Gannett case involved exclusion of the public from apre-
trial proceeding. The plurality utilized authority from both legal schol-
ars and English common law. Maitland has stated that regardless of
the public's right to view the actual trial proceedings, the boundaries of
the right do not extend to pretrial proceedings.4 1 Common law support
for the plurality's position that the provisions of the sixth amendment
do not extend to pretrial publicity can be found in Rex v. Fisher.42 In
Fisher the court forbade the dissemination of information about a pre-
trial hearing in order to protect the accused's right to receive a fair
trial. 43
Having analyzed the accused's sixth amendment right to a fair
trial, the plurality turned to the rights of the press under the first and
fourteenth amendments. The Court avoided the issue because the trial
court did not abridge the media's right of access to pretrial hearings."
The Court noted that the trial court had, in fact, safeguarded the right
in two ways. First, the trial court found that although the press had a
constitutional right, it was outweighed by the defendants' right to a fair
trial.45 Second, any denial of access was only temporary inasmuch as a
transcript of the proceedings was available once the danger of prejudice
to the defendants had dissipated.46
In sum, the plurality found that neither history, policy, nor prece-
40. Id at 2908. "The history upon which [Gannett relies] totally fails to demonstrate that the
Framers of the Sixth Amendment intended to create a constitutional right in strangers to attend a
pretrial proceeding .... " Id
41. "It must, of course, be remembered that the principle of publicity only applies to the
actual trial of a case, not necessarily to the preliminary or prefactory stages of the proceed-
ings. . . ." 99 S. Ct. at 2910 (quoting E. JENCKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 75 (6th ed. 1967)).
42. 2 Camp. 563, 170 Eng. Rep. 1253 (1811).
43. The court said:
Trials at law fairly reported, although they may occasionally prove injurious to indi-
viduals, have been held to be privileged. Let them continue so privileged. The benefit
they produce is great, and permanent, and the evil that arises from them is rare and
incidental. But these preliminary examinations have no such privilege. Their only ten-
dency is to prejudge those whom the law still presumes to be innocent, and to poison the
sources of justice.
Id at 571-72. 170 Eng. Rep. at 1255.
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dent evidenced any constitutionally enforceable right of public access
to a criminal pretrial proceeding.
II. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS
The concurring opinions of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Pow-
ell and Rehnquist added considerable gloss to the plurality's demarca-
tion. Chief Justice Burger demonstrated that the framers of the sixth
amendment did not intend the public's right of access to extend to a
criminal pretrial hearing. 7 He noted the framers' probable awareness
of the function of pretrial proceedings.48 Chief Justice Burger, there-
fore, focused on the plain meaning of the words and indicated that a
reading of the sixth amendment clearly demonstrates what the framers
intended.49 His concluding remark emphasized this viewpoint: "For
me, the essence. . is that by definition 'pretrial proceedings' are ex-
actly that."50
Justice Powell addressed the question reserved by the plurality"t
and would hold that the press has a first and fourteenth amendment
right of access to pretrial proceedings.52 His analysis would balance the
defendants' right to a fair trial against the access rights of the press and
the public.-3 This standard is met, according to Powell, if each group is
given an opportunity to be heard on the question of public exclusion
from the hearing.5 4 The defendant would be given an opportunity to
demonstrate that his right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.-5 The
state would be afforded an opportunity to show that public access
would either interfere with its interests in fair proceedings or reveal
government secrets.56 The press and public would have the responsi-
47. Id at 2913 (Burger, CJ., concurring). While Chief Justice Burger's approach might be
analyzed as part of one of the plurality's approaches, for the sake of analysis it is best to let it stand
on its own.
48. Id at 2914. The Chief Justice stated:
Written interrogatories were used pretrial in 18th century litigation, .. Thus, it is safe
to assume that those lawyers who drafted the Sixth Amendment were not unaware that
some testimony was likely to be recorded before trials took place. Yet, no one ever
suggested that there was any "right" of the public to be present at such pretrial proceed-
logs.
Id
49. Id at 2913-14.
50. Id at 2914.
51. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
52. 99 S. Ct. at 2916 (Powell, J., concurring).
53. Id at 2915.
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bility to show that "alternative procedures are available that would
eliminate the dangers shown by the defendant and the State. T57 Apply-
ing this standard, Justice Powell concluded that the press and public
were not entitled to exercise their right of access in this situation.58
Justice Rehnquist was opposed to the analysis utilized in Justice
Powell's balancing test. Justice Rehnquist referred to Powel's test as
"some sort of constitutional 'sunshine law'."5 9 He stated that "the
lower courts are under no constitutional constraint either to accept or
reject [Powell's] procedures."60 While Rehnquist commented that the
trial judge should carefully consider the competing interests, he is not
constitutionally required to exercise this discretion. Rehnquist stated
that judges "remain, in the best tradition of our federal system, free to
determine for themselves the question whether to open or close the pro-
ceeding."62 Rehnquist interpreted the Gannett decision as holding that
whenever the parties to litigation are in agreement that exclusion of the
press and public is in order, the court may, within its discretion, close
its doors. Rehnquist expressly would uphold this judicial discretion
"no matter how jurisprudentially appealing or unappealing" 63 the par-
ties' agreement may be.
III. THE DISSENTING OPINION
The dissent in Gannett, authored by Justice Blackmun, was re-
sponsive to the plurality's contentions inasmuch as it justified its posi-
57. Id
58. Applying the test, Justice Powell said:
At this oral argument, the trial court applied a standard similar to that set forth
above. It first reviewed for petitioner's counsel the factual basis for its finding that clo-
sure had been necessary to preserve the fairness of the defendants' trial. In the court's
view, the nature of the evidence to be considered at the hearing, the young age of two of
the defendants, and the extent of the publicity already given the case had indicated that
an open hearing would substantially jeopardize the fairness of the defendants' subse-
quent trial. Moreover, the court emphasized the fact that the prosecutor, as well as each
of the defense lawyers, had endorsed the closure motion. On the other hand, the court
found that petitioner had not presented any basis for changing the court's views on the
need for closure. Throughout oral argument the court recognized the constitutional right
of the press and public to be present at criminal proceedings. It concluded, however, that
in the 'very unique situation" presented to it, closure had been appropriate, and that the
seal it had placed upon the transcript of the suppression hearing should continue in
effect.
Id at 2917 (footnote omitted).
59. Id at 2918 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
60. Id See notes 51-58 supra and accompanying text.
61. Id at 2919.
62. Id (footnote omitted).
63. Id at 2918.
1979]
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tion with history, precedent and policy.64 Couching the issue
differently than did the plurality,65 the dissent asked "whether. . . the
Constitution prohibits the States from excluding, at the request of a
defendant, members of the public from such a hearing. 66
After disposing of a first amendment issue,67 the dissent began its
analysis by indicating that although the right to a public trial belongs to
the defendant, he is not at liberty to waive this right at will.6 8 The
proscription of a criminal defendant's right to waive certain constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights lends support to the dissent's position. For
example, in Faretta v. California69 the Court found that the sixth
amendment right to counsel does not necessarily imply an independent
right of self-representation.70 Similarly, in Singer v. United States,7
the Court decided that a defendant's right to a jury trial did not supply
an automatic correlative right to a bench trial.72
The Gannett dissent found that the history and structure of the
sixth amendment determine the defendants' right to a private hear-
ing.73 The dissenting Justices believed that Gannett was analagous to
both Faretta and Singer and would hold that the defendant generally
has a right to insist on a public trial, but lacks the correlative right to
waive a public trial at his will. Blackmun pointed to Anglo-Saxon tra-
64. The dissent, before addressing the merits of Gannett, rendered its own accounting of
some of the key facts leading up to the suppression hearing which the majority neglected to state.
For example, 90 days before the hearing, there was no publicity whatsoever regarding Clapp's
disappearance. Also, the dissent stated that the reporting by Gannett's newspapers was always
straightforward. There was no sensationalism. Id at 2919-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. Compare 99 S. Ct. at 2901 with id. at 2921.
66. Id at 2921.
67. The dissent stated that the Court has found, neither in Gannett, nor in prior cases, a first
amendment right of access to judicial proceedings. Id at 2922. "[T]his case involves no restraint
upon publication or upon comment about information already in the possession of the public or
the press." Id at 2940.
This view is also expressed in a recent comment to a law school audience by Justice Stevens.
The following is an excerpt from a magazine article recounting that event.
Justice John Paul Stevens entered the Gannett fray by pointing out that the high court
has never ruled that the First Amendment guaranteed a right of access to judicial pro-
ceedings. Stevens told an audience at the University of Arizona College of Law that
while the court has protected the right to disseminate information, it has never upheld
any right to acquire information. Whether that reasoning will continue to close court-
room doors to the press remains to be seen.
TIME, Sept. 17, 1979, at 82.
68. 99 S. Ct. at 2925.
69. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
70. Id at 807.
71. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
72. Id at 34.
73. 99 S. Ct. at 2925.
9
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dition and common law to show why the defendant lacks this right.74
Tracing the development of the royal courts, Blackmun stated that
"[plublicity. . . became intrinsically associated with the sittings of the
royal courts." 75 Blackmun appears, therefore, to be focusing on the in-
herent limits of the defendant's rights but he demonstrates these histor-
ical limits by showing that an open proceeding is still within the
public's domain. Quoting from Bentham 76 and tracing criminal pro-
ceedings in the American colonies, Blackmun concluded that history
has clearly shown that the public interest is sufficiently strong so as to
rule out any possibility that a defendant has a right to demand clo-
sure.7 7 The dissent stated that "[elarly colonial charters reflected the
view that open proceedings were an essential quality of a court of jus-
tice, and they cast the concept of a public trial in terms of a characteris-
tic of the system of justice, rather than of a right of the accused."7" The
dissent added that no colonial court "recognized the right of an accused
to compel a private trial."79
After concluding that history prevents a defendant from prohibit-
ing public access to criminal proceedings, the dissent analyzed the sixth
amendment and found that there are three societal interests in publicly
held trials. The first of these centers around the fact that trials and
suppression hearings often involve the legality of a State's action. Inas-
much as many of these actions occur hidden from the public scrutiny, it
is of prime importance that a hearing concerning their propriety be
open to the public.80 Second, public judicial proceedings have an edu-
cational role.8" Third, no matter how scrupulously fair a secret hearing
is, it is, by nature, suspect. Closed doors can only contribute to an ap-
pearance of injustice.8 2 These public interests exist "separately from,
and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused. 813
74. Id at 2926.
75. Id
76. "Bentham stressed that publicity was 'the most effectual safeguard of testimony, and of
the decisions depending on it; it is the soul of justice; it ought to be extended to every part of the
procedure, and to all causes."' Id at 2927 quoting J. BENTHAM, TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVI-
DENCE 67 (1825).
77. 99 S. Ct. at 2929.
78. Id at 2928.
79. Id
80. Id at 2930.
81. Elaborating upon the educative value of ajudicial proceeding, the dissent said: "Judges,
prosecutors, and police officials often are elected or are subject to some control by elected officials,
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The dissent thus countered the plurality's holding with both histor-
ical and policy oriented justifications. The dissent then attempted to
demonstrate that the public's right of access applies to a pretrial sup-
pression hearing. Blackmun offered three reasons why the right should
apply to both pretrial and trial proceedings. First, the suppression
hearing resembles a full trial in many details.8 4 Second, an evidentiary
ruling at the suppression hearing could have the effect of deciding the
entire case. 85 Third, statistics show that a great number of criminal
cases are disposed of before they ever get to the trial stage.86 These
factors led the dissent to conclude that a pretrial suppression hearing
"implicates all the policies that require that the trial be public." 87 A
pretrial hearing, therefore, carries with it the same right of access as
does a trial because of the great similarities between it and a trial.
Having established that the public does have a right of access to a
criminal pretrial proceeding, the dissent qualified that right by stating
that this right of access is not absolute. The dissent indicated that in
balancing the parties' respective rights, there may be situations when
closure is proper.8 In order to justify closure, the accused would have
to establish the presence of three criteria. First, he will need to show
that the impact of an open trial will result in permanent injury. 89 This
might involve a showing of an "impact on the jury pool."90 Second, the
accused must show that effective alternatives to banning the public are
unavailable.9 Thus, the accused would be required to show, for exam-
ple, that a change in venue would be an ineffective alternative. Third,
84. The dissent offered the following elements of resemblance:
Evidence is presented by means of live testimony, witnesses are sworn, and those wit-
nesses are subject to cross-examination. Determination of the ultimate issue depends in
most cases upon the trier of fact's evaluation of the evidence, and credibility is often
crucial. Each side has incentive to prevail, with the result that the role of publicity as a
testimonial safeguard, as a mechanism to encourage the parties, the witnesses, and the
court to a strict conscientiousness in the performance of their duties, and in providing a
means whereby unknown witnesses may become known, are just as important for the
suppression hearing as they are for the full trial.
Id at 2933.
85. Id
86. In 1976, in the Supreme Court for the City of New York, 89.7% of all criminal cases
were terminated by dismissal (25.6%) or by plea of guilty (64.1%). . . . In the Supreme
Courts and County Courts outside New York City, 93.4% of the criminal cases were
disposed of by dismissal (18.9%) or by plea of guilty (74.5%).
Id at 2934 n.14 (quoting New York Judicial Conference, 22d Ann. Rep. 52, 56 (1977)).
87. 99 S. Ct. at 2934.
88. Id at 2936-37.
89. Id at 2937.
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the defendant must show that there is a strong possibility that closing
the pretrial hearing will protect him against the harm.92 If the press has
already gained access to many of the facts, further access may not re-
sult in further harm.93
The dissent concluded that an application of these criteria did not
reveal any justification for closure.94 Given the fair and accurate re-
porting of the Gannett reporter,95 closure was an extreme and unrea-
sonable action.96
IV. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that Justice Powell's hope for a significant develop-
ment in first amendment rights was not granted by the Gannett Court.
This conclusion is based upon the refusal of the four dissenting Justices
to even reach a first amendment issue,97 coupled with Justice Rehn-
92. Id
93. Id
94. The dissent reached this conclusion by noting that Gannett's reporting was not sensa-
tional, see note 64 supra, that Gannett was already aware of the substance of the pretrial hearing,
and that the accused never offered proof that there are no alternatives to banning the public. Id
at 2940.
95. The following was a public protest by Gannett of the Court's decision:
SENECA FALLS, New York-In 1976, an expoliceman disappeared while fishing on
Seneca Lake in Upstate New York. Two men were arrested and accused of his murder,
even though the body was never found.
Carol Ritter, court reporter for Gannett Rochester Newspapers, went to cover the
pretrial hearing for the accused.
When she arrived at the courtroom, Ritter and other reporters were barred from the
hearing on the pretext that the accused would not be able to get a fair trial if the pretrial
hearing was covered by the press.
The Gannett Rochester Newspapers strongly disagreed and challenged the judge's
right to close the doors of justice to the people, including the press. They took that
challenge to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Gannett believes no judge should have the right to shut the people and their free
press out of such pretrial hearings, where an overwhelming majority of criminal prosecu-
tions are resolved.
Can you imagine up to 90 percent of all court cases being settled in secret? Gannett
could not. But on July 2, 1979, the Supreme Court ruled it could happen.
Gannett protests vigorously this abridgment of the First Amendment. Not only has
the Court limited journalists' access to gathering and reporting the news for the public,
but it has also trampled on the people's freedom to know, the cornerstone of our rights as
a free people in a free society.
The freedoms of the First Amendment must be cherished, not shackled.
At Gannett, we have a commitment to freedom in every business we're in, whether
it's newspaper, TV, radio, outdoor advertising or public opinion research.
And so from Burlington to Boise, from Fort Myers to Fort Wayne, every Gannett
newspaper, every TV and radio station is free to express its own opinions, free to serve
the best interests of its own community in its own way.
TIME, July 30, 1979, at 1.
96. 99 S. Ct. 2940.
97. Id at 2922. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
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quist's criticism of Powell's first amendment analysis.98
If the bare holding and Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion
in Gannett are reduced to their least common denominators, then it
may be fairly said that the decision in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale is,
perhaps, the Court's only rational choice between the vital interests99 of
the public to view a trial and those of the defendant to receive a fair
trial. The plurality utilized precedent' °° and policy' 0' to show that it is
the accused who enjoys a constitutional right to a public trial. The
sixth amendment confers no similar right upon the public. The public
enjoys no more than a non-constitutionally rooted interest in judicial
proceedings. 102 A reasonable inference from this holding is that there
is a gap between the power of the public and the power of the accused
to demand open proceedings. Accepting this premise, it must be afori-
or! concluded that the public interest must be subordinate to the right
of the accused to receive a fair trial. To hold otherwise would be to
vest the public with a right to determine the degree of justice that the
accused is to receive.
Chief Justice Burger,1°3 and to some extent the plurality,1t4 added
a second dimension to the bare holding that the right to a public trial
belongs to the accused. 05 The second dimension is that, aside from a
consideration of who is vested with the right of access, this right should
not be construed to apply to pretrial hearings. Burger defended this
conclusion by inferring the intent of the framers of the sixth amend-
ment.'0 6 He concluded that if the framers had intended to extend the
right of access to include pretrial proceedings, they would have ex-
pressly included such a right in the amendment. 0 7 This conclusion is
sound in light of the different functions served by trial and pretrial pro-
ceedings.'08
The dissenting opinion concluded that it is the public who shall
98. Id at 2918.
99. The very nature of the conflict demands a balancing approach and it is very doubtful,
therefore, that Justice Rehnquist's statement that Gannett applies to all criminal trials, Id at 2917,
should be viewed as anything more than dicta.
100. See notes 14-32 supra and accompanying text.
101. See notes 33-46 supra and accompanying text.
102. 99 S. Ct. at 2907.
103. Id at 2913-14.
104. id at 2909-10.
105, Id at 2913-14 and 2909-10, respectively.
106. Id at 2914.
107. Id See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
108, See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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decide whether the courtroom shall be open and that this right extends
to pretrial proceedings. This analysis flies in the face of both policy
and history and is, therefore, untenable. The public's right of access to
pretrial proceedings should always be guaged by its effect on the ac-
cused's right to a fair trial. The borders of the public's right should
extend no further than those which demarcate fairness and justice to
the defendant. The fair trial rights of the defendant must never be
subordinated to the interests of a curious public. For this reason, the
language seems all too clear: "The requirement of a public trial is for
the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with
and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested specta-
tors may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibil-
ity. .. 19
Philo Hof
109. 99 S. Ct. at 2906 quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25 (1948) quoting I COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927).
1979]
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